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JACQUE L. EMEL*

Groundwater Rights:
Definition and Transfer
INTRODUCTION

Ill-defined property rights to groundwater are a continuing problem for
those who seek to expedite the market allocation of water.' Indefinite
rights cannot be transferred with ease. In states that follow the appropriation doctrine, a right cannot be transferred if another existing water
right is "impaired" or injured. 2 Most appropriating states define impairment of a groundwater right as an "unreasonable" lowering of the static
or pumping water level.3 This "reasonableness" standard is inherently
discretionary when applied and obscures the identity of groundwater as
a commodity to be transferred. 4 According to Demsetz, the definition of

a property right significantly forms the expectations a person holds when
dealing with others in regard to that right. 5 Expectations could be much
*Professor, Graduate School of Geography, Clark University.
1.See, e.g., C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKETTRANSFERS OFWATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED
MARKET FOR WATER RESOURCES 27-32 (National Water Comm., Legal Study No. 4, NTIS No.
NWC-L-71-009, 1971); M. KELSO, W. MARTIN & L. MACK, WATER SUPPUEs AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
INAN ARID ENVIRONMENT 27 (1973); Anderson, Burt & Fractor in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 223-42 (T. Anderson ed. 1983) [hereinafter
Anderson]; L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ANDALTERNATIVE
INSTrrUTIONS 6-33 (1970).
2. For a discussion of "impairment" see Schaab, PriorAppropriation, Impairment, Replacements,
Models and Markets, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 25 (1983). See also Grant, Reasonable Groundwater
Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine: The Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21
NAT. RESOURCES J.I(1981), and Doyle, The Transportation Provisions ofArizona's 1980 Groundwater Management Act: A Proposed Definition of Compensable Injury, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (1984).
3. For statutory language on reasonable water levels, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-598(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1986); Coto. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 42226 (1977 and Cum. Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §82a-71 Ia (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §852-508 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(4), (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3 (1985); OR.
REV. STAT. §§537.525, 537.620, 537.665-700 (1985); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §46-6-6.1 (1983
Rev.); WASH. REv. CODE § 90-44.070 (1962); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-933 (1977).
4. The effectiveness of the market in allocating resources to their highest-valued use depends
upon commodity identification and five other factors. Brown, McDonald, Tysseling & DuMars,
Water Reallocation, Market Proficiency,and Conflicting Social Values, in WATER AND AGRICULTURE
INTHE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 193, 200-201 (G. Weatherford
ed. 1982), identify these "proficiency" contributing factors as: 1)the degree of market accessibility,
2) the quantity and quality of information conveyed on the market, 3) the ability of the market to
adjust to changing conditions, 4) the identification of the market commodity, 5) the convenience of
the market transaction, and 6) the extent of commodity characteristics captured and equilibriated by
the price mechanism in the market. This discussion focuses on the fourth characteristic-identification
of the market commodity.
5. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 347 (Vol. 2-Papers
and Proceedings) (1967).
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more certain if "impairment" were defined clearly by the appropriating
states.
Some writers, operating under a misconception of groundwater hydrology principles, have suggested that transferring groundwater rights
on the basis of "consumptive use" solves the problem of third-party
effects. 6 The concept of consumptive use comes from current allocation
of surface water. The heart of the misconception is that an underground
aquifer cannot be treated as a surface reservoir. In a surface reservoir
withdrawal effects are immediately transmitted throughout the body of
water. Withdrawal effects in a groundwater system may take hundreds
of years to be transmitted from place to place. 7 Thus, using consumptive
use as a limitation on the right to transfer does not necessarily, and will
most likely not, produce the same hydrologic response in the new context
of aquifers as it did in the older context.
In this paper, I offer a definition of property rights for groundwater
use that resolves the problem of indefiniteness. By this definition property
rights are enforceable and in harmony with other goals for aquifer development. The paper demonstrates that third-party effects can occur when
groundwater is privatized; where consumptive use is the measure of the
right. Nevertheless, a property rights system devised to limit third-party
effects can expedite the market allocation of groundwater. The approach
requires the establishment of formal limits on the effects a third-party
must endure from the pumping of others and on the impact a pumper can
have on the static water level. In the absence of formal limits, the market
commodity is not as identifiable as it can be. This formalization of limits
on hydrologic response to pumping, however, requires a significant departure from the discretionary interpretation of the concepts of "impairment" and "reasonableness" in the lowering of the static or pumping
water level that has historically taken place in several western states.
The first part of this paper describes two major goals of groundwater
supply management that must be operationalized to mitigate the problems
of development rate and pumping externality. The second part shows how
criteria and modelling can provide a right definition that accomplishes
the two goals. The third section examines the problem of transfer. In the
last section, trade-offs attendant to a change from the discretionary interpretation of rights to a formal, regularized definition are discussed.
6. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 238. Surface rights defined in terms of consumptive use
can also generate undesirable third-party effects depending on the rate of flow relative to the rate of
diversion. See Johnson, Gisser& Wemer, The Definition ofa Surface Water Rightand Transferability,
24 J. LAW & ECON. 273 (1981).
7. Bredehoeft, Papadopulos & Cooper, Groundwater: The Water-Budget Myth, ScIENrwnc BASIS
OF WATER-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (National Academy Press, Wash., D.C., 1982).

Summer 1987)

GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF GROUNDWATER SUPPLY
MANAGEMENT
Operational objectives of groundwater supply management are considered in this section. Operational objectives are philosophical or political
goals translated into hydrologic objectives that are ultimately accomplished by projecting and regulating the magnitude and distribution of
pumping effects upon the hydrologic system. Property right protection
and aquifer development management are the two major operational objectives used in the design of the property right definition proposed herein.
Protection of Property Rights in Groundwater
Like most property rights, a groundwater right is several rights. A
groundwater right entails the right of use, the right to derive income from
use, the right to security or protection from expropriation (by the state),
the right of transfer, and the right to possess or exclude others from the
use or benefits of the water. Administrative agencies, courts and legislatures involved in groundwater supply management are primarily concerned with protecting the right of possession or exclusion. Because the
fluid nature of the groundwater resource precludes a right holder from
physical possession of the water in the ground, a groundwater right is a
right of access rather than a right to a particular group of water molecules.
In general, a right holder expects the state or the community to protect
access by preventing others from interfering with that access. The dynamics of groundwater flow, however, make the effects of pumping in
different places interrelated, ensuring the occurrence of interference. The
effect in one well from the pumping of others in the same aquifer system
is an increase in the pumping lift. The pumping lift is the distance between
the land surface and the level of water in a well when pumping is in
progress. When pumping begins in a well, the water level in the area is
lowered as water is withdrawn from storage in the vicinity of the well.
The shape of this lowered surface is known as the "cone of depression."
The effect of overlapping cones of depression (or "well interference")
is to increase the pumping lift in both wells beyond what would exist if
either of the two wells were pumped alone (see Figure 1).
The water level in a well will recover when a well is shut off. The
recovered water level may approach but not achieve the static water level
prior to the start of pumping because some water will have been removed
from storage in an unconfined aquifer system or artesian pressure will
have been reduced in a confined system. These reductions in static water
level (or pressure) over a period of time will cause increases in pumping
lifts even where well interference is not immediately apparent. Figure 2
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illustrates the additional pumping lift caused by a decline in the static
water level.
Given the effects pumpers can work upon each other in a common
groundwater pool, property right protection requires a limitation of 1)

the additional pumping lift from well interference, and 2) the annual
average rate of static (nonpumping) water level decline. Only by controlling these two hydrologic responses can an administrative agency
protect a right holder's access to groundwater.
Aquifer Development Management
Several groundwater supply management agencies in the western United
States attempt to achieve aquifer development goals that are generally
distinguishable from the goal of property rights protection. These "public
interest" goals have to do with the rate of development of the aquifer.'
Aquifers may be developed as renewable or exhaustible resources. The
statutes of Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, and Washington require that groundwater be considered a renewable resource, or they em-

power state officials to manage it in such a manner. Variously phrased,
the statutes mandate that withdrawals shall not exceed the average annual

rate of recharge or replenishment. 9 Although not explicitly stating that
the policy of the state is to manage groundwater according to replenish-

ment rates or some semblance thereof, the criteria for establishing critical
or control areas in Wyoming, Montana, and Oregon refer to this concept.'
8. For an analysis of the objectives and programs of groundwater management agencies in the
western United States see Emel, Effectiveness and Equity of Groundwater Management Methods in
the Western United States, Working Paper No. 3, Arizona State University Center for Environmental
Studies (1984).
9. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-561.6 (Cum. Supp. 1986) defines "safe-yield" as"... a groundwater
management goal which attempts to achieve and thereafter maintain a long-term balance between
the annual amount of groundwater withdrawn in an active management area and the annual amount
of natural and artificial groundwater recharge ....
IDAHO CODE § 42-237a(g) (1977 & Cum. Supp.
1986) states that water is not available for appropriation when withdrawals would exceed the "reasonably anticipated average rate of future natural recharge." NEV. REV, STAT. § 534. 110(6) (1986)
grants the State Engineer authority to limit or modify withdrawal rates where "average annual
replenishment" may not provide for all appropriators. S.D. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §46-6-3.1 (1983
Rev.) declares that the Water Management Board may not allow "the quantity of water withdrawn
annually from a groundwater source (to] exceed the quantity of the average estimated annual recharge
of water to the groundwater source." The Washington Department of Ecology Director is given
authority to limit or modify withdrawal rates to enforce maintenance of a "safe sustaining yield"
(WASH. REV. CODE §90.44.130, 230 (1962)).
10. The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation may propose to the Board
of Natural Resources and Conservation that an area of controlled groundwater be designated where
groundwater withdrawals are in excess of recharge in the area (MoNTr.CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 (1985)).
The Oregon State Engineer may initiate proceedings to establish a critical groundwater area when
the available groundwater supply within the area is overdrawn or about to be overdrawn (ORE. REV.
STAT. § 537.730 (1985)). The Wyoming Board of Control may designate as a "control area" any
underground water district or subdistrict in which the use of groundwater is approaching a use equal
to the current recharge rate (or groundwater levels are declining or have declined excessively). Wyo.
STAT. §41-3-912 (1977).
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Both North Dakota and Utah attempt to manage groundwater as a re-.
newable supply though no reference is made to the concept in their
respective statutes." In addition, two Kansas groundwater management
districts (Big Bend and Equus Beds) and several California districts are
committed to a sustained-yield aquifer development objective.
Aquifers in New Mexico, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Arizona,
Washington, and Nebraska are being mined according to depletion schedules. 2 Many of these aquifers are essentially nontributary to surface water
systems, and recharge is judged insignificant with respect to the quantity
of water in storage (or the amount of existing pumpage). 3 Planned depletion of an aquifer provides security of expectation and economic stability over time. It seeks not only to provide tenure security to right
holders but to prevent a larger scale socio-economic dislocation caused
by an abrupt loss of affordable resource.' 4 On a planned depletion schedule, groundwater supplies are developed to last over a specified period
of time. Even an isolated groundwater user, unthreatened by other pumpers, may be prohibited from producing water at a rate that is unsustainable over the planning period. '"
Attainment of the management goals of perennial yield or planned
depletion requires hydrologic response control. Hydrologic response is
the change in water level caused by the rate and location of pumpage
with respect to other aquifer characteristics. 6 A management agency can
indirectly control hydrologic response by directing the pumping rates of
wells, and the location and configuration of wells. 7
11. Telephone interviews with Milton Lindvig. hydrologist, State Water Commission, Office of
the State Engineer of North Dakota (Jan. 1981) & Dallen Jensen, legal counsel, Utah Dept. of
Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights (Jan. 1981).
12. Emel, supra note 8, at 6; and Clark, The Role of State Legislation in Ground Water Management, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 469 (1977). For a theoretical treatment of planned depletion see
Burt, Cummings, & McFarland, Defining Upper Limits to Groundwater Development in the Arid
West, AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 943 (1977).
13. A good example is the Lea County Basin of New Mexico. Estimated water in storage was
26,400,000 acre-feet; estimated annual average recharge was only 29,000 acre-feet. See Harris,
Water Allocation under the Appropriation Doctrine in the Lea County Underground Basin of New
Mexico, THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES, 155 (1956).
14. Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law: PropertyRights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation,
5 NAT. RESOURCES J. I (1965). Dunbar's PioneeringGroundwaterLegislation in the United States:
Mortgages, Land Banks, and Institution-Building in New Mexico, 47 PAC. HIST. REV. 579 (1978),
description of institutional pioneering in the Roswell Artesian Basin is an excellent example of the
economic turmoil caused by the banks' refusal to lend money to irrigators in a rapidly depleting
aquifer.
15. E.g., in the Southwest Kansas Groundwater Management District, a proposed appropriation
when added to other existing rights, cannot exceed a calculated rate of depletion of more than forty
percent in twenty-five years of the saturated thickness underlying the area included within a twomile radius whose center is the location of the proposed well. SOUTHWEST KANSAS GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT DIsTIr, REVISED MANAGEMENT PROGRAM Itt (1985).
16. Water level response to pumping depends upon the aquifer parameters (transmissivity and
storage coefficient), the boundary conditions, and the location and geometry of the wells within the
system. For more detail see D. TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 1 l1-63 (1980).
17. See Emel, supra note 8, at 4.
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A successful perennial yield (renewable resource) program establishes
pumping patterns that lead to a long term equilibrium in nonpumping or
static water levels. t8 A successful planned depletion program controls the
rate of nonpumping water level decline over the designated lifetime of
the basin. 9 For example, in the Odessa area of Washington, the maximum
decline of the nonpumping water level (as measured each year) cannot
exceed thirty feet in three years. 2" In the Mimbres Basin of New Mexico,
the annual rate of decline is limited to 2.5 feet over the period 1975
through 1994.2" Even in the Colorado designated basins and the Kansas
districts that respectively use 3-mile and 2-mile radius circles to calculate
water availability, the effect is to control static water level decline. 2
18. See Bredehoeft, Papadopulos & Cooper, supra note 7. Groundwater levels will achieve an
equilibrium only if pumping wells capture discharge or rejected recharge. It takes time for rejected
recharge and discharge to be captured by a well's cone of depression, however, and during that time
water levels will decline as water is taken out of storage. The time delay could be days or centuries
depending upon aquifer characteristics and the location and pumping rates of wells. Bredehoeft,
Papadopulos, and Cooper found that wells located in the middle of a hypothetical but typical
intermontane aquifer took over 1000 years to intercept all of the discharge. Wells located near the
discharge site intercepted the entire discharge in 500 years.
19. The length of the planning period is predicated upon ensuring a useful lifetime for investments
of capital in land or pumping facilities. In the Lea County and Portales Underground Water Basins
of New Mexico, the planning period is 40 years. C. CORKER. GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION (National Water Comm., Legal Study No. 6, NWC-L-72-026 1971), claims
the 40 year period is 2 generations, represents the average period of time for amortization of a farm
loan, and corresponds with repayment provisions for irrigators under federal reclamation law. The
planning period for Oklahoma aquifers and for the Lordsburg Valley and Mimbres Underground
Water Basins in New Mexico is 20 years. Colorado's designated aquifers and Southwest Kansas
Groundwater Management District No. 3 are managed over a 25 year period. In Fundingsland v.
the Colorado Groundwater Comm., 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835, 837 (1970), a farm and ranch
representative for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company testified that 25 years was a reasonable period for amortization of an investment in well facilities. Depreciation of a well and power
unit with zero salvage is estimated at 25 years by the Cooperative Extension Service at the University
of Arizona.
20. See WASH. AOMIN. CODE R. 173-130-040. Washington State University conducted a study
in 1971 to determine a feasible pumping lift for irrigation in the Odessa area. At that time, the
conclusions suggested that 700 feet of lift was the limit for a reasonable economic return providing
the decline was not more than 10 feet per year to avoid making major well changes more than every
10 years. Telephone interview with J.Wallace, Water Resources Department of the Office of the
State Engineer, Washington (Jan. 1981).
21. Memorandum from D. Gray to S. E. Reynolds (Aug. 4, 1982) (discussing Mimbres Basin,
New Mexico, Administrative Criteria).
22. The "circle" approach places the proposed well at the center of the circle (either 2 miles or
3 miles in radius depending upon the location). The quantity of water that can be withdrawn over
time within the circle is calculated using the following equation:
X
T+ R,
where Q
maximum annual rate of groundwater withdrawal
X
total quantity of groundwater to be mined
T
length of planning period in years
R
annual rate of recharge (this term should be replaced with -C" to represent captured
discharge and rejected recharge).
The determination of "X," the exhaustible stock, is calculated by multiplying the recoverable

Q

=
=
=
=
=
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The two goals of property right protection and planned aquifer development thus translate into the operational objectives of limiting 1) the
cumulative well interference endured by any one pumper from the effects
of pumping by others, and 2) the rate of nonpumping water level decline.
An application for a right to withdraw groundwater must satisfy these
objectives in order to protect existing rights and the public's interest in
resource longevity.
THE PROPERTY RIGHT DESIGN
Several authors have proposed solving the "common pool" problem
of groundwater by carefully defining property rights.23 These proposals
have recommended that rights be assigned to proportions of both the
"stock" and "flow" elements of a groundwater system. 24 Theoretically,
upon assignment of these rights, the incentive to ownership competition
would be removed and each right holder would allocate stocks over time
such that present values of marginal returns in each time period are equal 25
This approach to right specification fails, however, because it ignores the
fact that water levels (specifically, depths to water)-not simply pumping
rates-influence pumping costs and, therefore, marginal returns.26 If we
were to adopt the proposal specifying rights in stock and flow, access to
water might not be adequately protected and water level declines could
be locally severe (possibly bringing on subsidence or water quality deterioration). A major problem with the stock and flow proposal is that
flow-defined as average annual recharge-is not the factor that is of
primary interest in determining the magnitude of aquifer development.
As Theis showed in 1940, the discharge by wells imposes a new discharge
on the aquifer system. The new discharge disrupts the equilibrium of the
saturated thickness by the average storage coefficient or specific yield and the area within the circle.
Recoverable stock in Colorado is 40% of the saturated thickness; in the Lea County Underground
Water Basin of New Mexico, 60% of the saturated thickness is recoverable.
The Oklahoma planned depletion program is significantly different than the New Mexico, Washington, Kansas, and Colorado programs. Prorationing the maximum annual yield to acres of land
overlying an aquifer does not necessarily control water level declines. For an example of this
approach, see OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, ORDER FOR DETERMINATION OF THE TENTATIVE
MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD OF FRESH GROUND WATER FROM THE OGALLALA GROUND WATER BASIN

IN TILLMAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (1981).

23. See Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources,
18 UCLA L. REV. 855 (1971); Smith, Water Deeds: A Proposed Solution to the Water Valuation
Problem, 26 ARIZ. REV. 7 (1977): Anderson, supra note 1,at 223.
24. The "stock" is the water in storage and the "flow" is the average annual recharge (the
renewable component).
25. Friedman, supra note 23, at 872-76; Anderson, supra note I, at 239.
26. Friedman, supra note 23, at 885, acknowledged the difficulty in applying his "formulae" to
aquifer mining as the failure to consider the "manner of (water) removal." Anderson, supra note
I, at 238, also mentioned that to grasp the benefits of their proposal, one should assume no pumping
costs, an aquifer with smooth, perpendicular sides, a perfectly flat bottom, and no overlapping cones
of depression (no interference).
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aquifer system under natural conditions and ". . . must be balanced by
an increase in the recharge of the aquifer, or by a decrease in the old
natural discharge, or by a loss of storage in the aquifer, or by a combination of these." 27 Because capture by wells of rejected recharge or
discharge is governed by well location, aquifer transmissive and storage
properties, and other factors, it is incorrect to assume that each right
holder can capture "flow." This misconception is called the "water-budget
myth" by hydrologists Bredeloeft, Papadopulos, and Cooper.28 Defining
groundwater rights as shares in storage and average annual natural recharge has little meaning unless flow is defined as captured discharge or
rejected recharge.
Instead, I propose that a well-defined groundwater property ight-one
that allows the formation of expectations in dealings with others and
"specifies how persons may be benefited and harmed" 29 -requires the
proclamation of a fixed limit on the allowable cumulative well interference
at the property owner's well head and a fixed limit on the rate or extent
of nonpumping water level decline in the general area of the well or
throughout the aquifer as a whole. Knowing these two criteria in advance,
water resource managers can use models to project the hydrologic impacts
from proposed (or existing) pumping facilities and approve or deny withdrawal applications accordingly. The focus is appropriately on the two
components of pumping lift: drawdown and the nonpumping or recovered
water level (refer to Figures 1 and 2). Criteria establishment, modelling,
and information provision are the transaction costs of establishing welldefined property rights in groundwater.3"
For the most part, specification of groundwater property rights in the
manner described above is not a startlingly new concept. The New Mexico
Office of the State Engineer has been evaluating permits using water level
decline criteria and analytical groundwater models for twenty years. 3
With the exception of California, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas, all
of the contiguous western states conduct analyses of drawdown impacts
from proposed wells during application evaluation.32 Many state and
27. Theis, The Source of Water Derived from Wells: Essential Factors Controlling the Response
of an Aquifer to Development, 10 Civ. ENG. 277 (1940).
28. Bredehoeft, Papadopulos & Cooper, supra note 7.
29. Demsetz, supra note 5 at 347.
30. Transaction costs are broadly defined. For example, see Randall, The Problem of Market
Failure, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 131 (1983).
31. See Emel, Groundwater Right Protection and Aquifer Development Management, Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Arizona 52-64 (1983) (University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan);
Galloway & Wright, Administration of Water Rights: Portales Valley Underground Water Basin,
New Mexico, Office of the New Mexico State Engineer (1968) (mimeographed); Memo from Gray
to S. E. Reynolds (Aug. 4, 1982) (Discussing Mimbres Basin Administrative Criteria).
32. The seventeen contiguous western states are Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Utah,
Nevada, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. See Emel, supra note 31, at 57, 58, 67, 92, 93.
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district groundwater agencies use models suitable for nonpumping water
level projections over larger areas, although not necessarily for the purpose of evaluating applications for withdrawal."
What is more uncommon is the establishment of formal, quantitative
limits for cumulative interference and nonpumping water level decline.
A well spacing criterion requiring several hundred feet between wells
limits interference to some extent but not precisely enough to satisfy our
definition of property rights. For example, suppose a criterion requiring
1000 feet between wells is chosen because at that distance, drawdown
interference from a well that pumps at an average rate (over an average
irrigation season) under average aquifer conditions is approximately one
foot. This criterion assumes that aquifer properties are homogeneous
throughout, that pumping rates from all wells are about the same, and
that the number of wells per unit area is relatively constant. If any of
these assumptions are violated, the interference impact will be greater or
lesser than one foot, and right protection will be inconsistent with expectations."
Reasonable pumping level regulation is another means of defining (and
protecting) property rights in groundwater in the western United States. 5
Grant explored the social and economic goals that underlie the standard
of "reasonableness" using statutory and case law.36 His conclusions illustrate how the vagueness of the standard allows for a multiplicity of
justifications for right definition, thus leading to widely differing interpretations of "reasonableness." Neither the statutes nor the courts have
formally quantified the concept of a reasonable pumping lift.17 In fact,
in Wayman v. Murray City Corporation,3" the Utah Supreme Court argued
against a formal definition by allowing that the "rule of reasonableness"
involves:
...an analysis of the total situation: the quantity of water available,
the average annual recharge in the basin, the existing rights and their
33. Emel, supra note 31, at 54. For a general description of a digital model see Schaab, supra
note 2, at 45-50. For an overview of existing digital models see S. Gorelick, A Review of Distributed
Parameter Groundwater Management Modeling Methods, 19(2) WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 305
(1983).
34. It should be understood, however, that even though site-specific analysis of the projected
drawdown of a proposed well coupled with fixed limits on allowable interference would yield better
defined property rights in groundwater, well spacing guidelines have in some cases prevented much
interference that would have occurred in their absence (interview with G. Baker, manager, Southwest
Kansas Groundwater Management District (June 1985)).
35. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. §37-90-102 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985) states that: "Prior
appropriation of groundwater should be protected and reasonable groundwater pumping levels maintained, but not to include maintenance of historical water levels."
36. Grant, supra note 2, and Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine: Underlying Social Goals, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 53 (1983).
37. Grant, supra notes 2, 36; and Schaab, supra note 2, attest to this conclusion.
38. Wayman v. Murray City Corporation, 458 P.2d 865, 866 (1969).
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priorities. All users are required where necessary to employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own waters in relation to
others to the end that wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest

amount of available water is put to beneficial use...
The absence of specific statutory guidance may be intentional. Grant
suggests that some of the appeal of the standard lies in the flexibility
afforded by its vagueness. 39 The vagueness does allow for the administrative application of situational ethics to each case. To a great extent,
what is "reasonable" is determined by local users. Control area designation and in-depth evaluation of permit applications are often initiated
by users rather than by administrators in states employing the reasonable
pumping level concept." Local determination and situational ethics are
appealing societal constructs. As far as promoting well-defined, easily
identifiable market commodities, however, the discretionary case-by-case
approach is less appealing than is the fixed criteria approach. As Trelease
so colorfully observed in commenting on an excessively discretionary
property rights system:
I think the poor bureaucrat, juggling equality, equity, economic ef-

ficiency, public health and safety, protection of investment, and protection of workers' jobs and farmers' livelihoods, might at this point
take to the bottle, either milk for his ulcer or whiskey to forget his

troubles. 4'

Nevertheless, in terms of establishing a fixed criterion for the hydrologic response limits, case law interpretations of "reasonableness" offer
some guidelines. These are: (1) that no right holder is entitled to maintenance of pristine water levels, particularly in essentially nonrecharging
aquifers," (2) that existing right holders' means of diversion must be
adequate," 3 and (3) that, at least in some instances, domestic wells of
adequate penetration and condition are to be guaranteed access in lieu or
39. For a general discussion of the merits of standards vis-a-vis formal rules see Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
40. Emel, supra note 31, at 68.
41. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the Goddam Bureaucrat, 14
NAT. RESOURCES J. 207, 217 (1974).
42. See Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966). See generally Schaab's
supra note 2, at 34-37, discussion of impairment; Emel. supra note 31, at 55-61; Grant, supra
note 2, at 8-13; and Comment, Protection of the Means of Groundwater Diversion, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 625 (1980).
43. See Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861 (1969); Colorado Springs
v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); Schaab, supra note 2, at 36-40. The requirements
of adequacy appear to be: I) an intact well casing, 2) a reasonably efficient pump, 3) a properly
designed and constructed well, and 4) penetration to a reasonable depth. A local well driller, worth
his salt, could probably give a sufficiently sound estimate of a penetration depth which would be
adequate over the 25 year lifetime of a well.
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in kind.' In synthesis, these three guidelines suggest a set of criteria for
cumulative well interference and nonpumping water level decline that
would protect state-of-the-art domestic pumping facilities over their useful
lifetime (approximately 20 to 30 years).

Management of groundwater mining using a fixed rate of allowable
nonpumping water level decline in evaluation of withdrawal applications,
as discussed previously, is occurring in several planned depletion areas
of the western states. In some management areas committed to perennial

yield, a nonpumping water level equilibrium is used as a criterion for
directing pumping and artificial recharge timing and spacing.' This nonpumping water level management is half of what is necessary to establish
well-defined property rights. The remaining half requires establishment
of the maximum allowable rate (or, in some areas, the seasonal magnitude)
of cumulative interference to be borne by a right holder. A well spacing
criterion is a rudimentary substitute for such a limit, but a site-specific
drawdown analysis combined with an established limit will more accurately serve the purpose.

TRANSFER
Regulation of hydrologic response to pumping clearly defines groundwater rights and provides legal, physical, and tenure certainty.4 Externalities or spillover effects on third-parties are limited, the rate of aquifer
development is controlled, and enforcement may be undertaken with some
ease. The next problem to contend with is the transference of rights to
achieve an efficient allocation.47
The transfer of a water right can involve either or both a reassignment
44. See Fraser v. Water Rights Comm. of Dept. of Natural Resources, 294 N.W.2d 784 (S.D.
1980); Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. I, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978); Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation of the State of Montana v. Crumpled Horn, Mont. 9th Jud. Dist. (May 16, 1978).
45. The Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District and the Central and West Basin Water
Replenishment District in California use the water levels in key wells to manage artificial recharge.
Interviews with J. Bray, manager, Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District, and J. Joham,
Assistant General Manager (Jan. 1981).
46. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights, 32 LAND
ECON. 297 (1956). Legal certainty is concerned with protection against unlawful acts of others.
Physical certainty has to do with the actual availability of water. Tenure certainty involves the
protection of the water right against lawful acts of others. For further clarification, see Milliman,
Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 41 (1959).
47. Gisser & Johnson, Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and the Survival
of an Agency, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCES ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 137, 139-40 (T. Anderson, ed. 1983), define an efficient allocation (assuming relatively
low transaction costs) as one that results in the marginal physical product of consumptive use being
equal for all users. The value of the marginal physical product of water is the "addition to total
output from an incremental increase in the amount of water applied." Id., at 141.
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in the same location or a transfer of place of diversion.4" In either case,
a determination must be made of the commodity content. The rule of
thumb is that the reassignment or transfer can involve only the amount
consumed by the original use.4 9 This rule evolved from the interdependency of water uses (the same water may be used over and over again)
and the consequent need to protect rights to the return flow from another's
diversion. 5"
In a groundwater system, a consumptive use transfer does not necessarily guarantee third-party protection. With both the reassignment and
the transfer of diversion, third-party effects must be evaluated. In the
case of reassignment, withdrawal timing may change and this could alter,
perhaps worsen, third-party impacts. The more serious problem, however,
is the change of withdrawal location. A consumptive use transfer will
protect right holders in the original withdrawal location, but it will not
necessarily meet well interference and water level decline criteria in the
new location. The following discussion shows why.
Groundwater systems react much more slowly than do surface water
systems. For this reason, as well as others, they cannot be assumed to
operate as single cell basins (or bathtubs). The effects of pumping a well
gradually spread from the well location throughout the aquifer. For this
reason, the consumptive use of a right holder will, if transferred to another
location, cause a change in third-party impact.
Consider the simple hypothetical groundwater system depicted in Figure 3. Basin dimensions are twenty-one miles by seventeen miles, the
transmissivity is .01 square feet per second and the storage coefficient is
.002. Pumping, first simulated at location A, generates the solid line
drawdown contours. Pumping discontinued at A and simulated at B produces the dashed line drawdown contours. Pumping rates are identical
at both sites and all of the water pumped comes from storage. With the
exception of the shaded areas, the patterns of drawdown (and therefore
pumping lift) are different at the two locations. Shifting a right from site
A to site B will affect third-party interests differently outside of the shaded
area.
The location of wells with respect to sites of recharge, discharge and
other boundary conditions (that is, impermeable mountain fronts); the
48. W. HUrcHINS, I WATER RiGITs LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, 468 (1971) uses
the term "place of use" rather than place of diversion. In some areas groundwater rights are not
severable from land. E.g, in Arizona, irrigation rights are appurtenant to the land and may not be
conveyed separately from the land (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §45-465(C) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). In the Big
Bend Groundwater Management District of Kansas, rights can be sold but the point of diversion
cannot be moved more than 1320 feet (interview with R. Davis, manager, Big Bend Groundwater
Management District (June 1985)).
49. See F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 209 (3rd ed. 1979).
50. Id. Consumptive use is that quantity of the total withdrawal of water which is not returned
to the local groundwater system within a reasonable time period.
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FIGURE 3
Plan View of Drawdown Contours (in feet) Generated by Pumping at Two
Locations in a Homogeneous Aquifer
transmissive and storage properties of an aquifer; and prepumping water
levels can alter patterns of drawdown and nonpumping water level decline
between sites. Clearly, consumptive use transfers, alone, are not enough
to prevent undesirable third-party effects.
This means, then, that every transaction has to go through an agency
possessing the data and models necessary to evaluate the hydrologic
responses of proposed pumping scheme changes. Of course, if the transaction involves only a change of ownership and not a change in pumping
pattern (for example, location or timing), the transaction evaluation need
5I. J. BAGLEY, K. KIMBALL & L. KAPALOSKI, FEASIBILITY STUDY OF ESTABLISHING A WATER RIGHTS
BANKING/BROKERING SERVICE INUTAH, at II (Utah State University, Logan, 1980), suggested that
a water brokerage service could project and resolve third party impact problems. In the category of
impacts they include quality as well as quantity alterations.
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only be cursory." 2 If the transaction involves a relocation, and model
projections indicate the established hydrologic response criteria will be
exceeded, additional rights must be purchased or leased. An alternate
solution would require that existing rights be provided for by other acceptable means (that is, water from the new entrant's well). 53Any arrangement between the new entrant and existing right holders must be
operable within the limits of the criteria.54
As the effect of the proposed criteria may be to alter the quantity of
right that can be withdrawn if transferred over a distance from A to B,
the incentive exists for a prospective buyer to look for a right of comparable size to his need in the location of his proposed use. A major
benefit of this proposed property right definition is that development of
the water supply will occur in those areas of the aquifer that are the
highest yielding relative to pumping drawdown and recovery levels. Within
the limits established for hydrologic responses, more water can be withdrawn in these areas of higher transmissivities and storage coefficients,
and greater proximity to discharge and recharge sites.
The right definition may be used to begin to control water level response
to pumping even in aquifers with severe water level declines. For example, in the Tucson Arizona Active Management Area, pumping lowered
groundwater levels by as much as 150 feet between 1953 and 1982."
The pumping rates that caused such alarming water level declines became
grandfathered groundwater rights as a result of the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Code.5" Although the 1980 Code does not call for an immediate
reduction of pumping rates in areas of severe decline and instead authorizes implementation of a forty-five year demand management program, hydrologic response criteria could be used to force prospective
right holders to buy rights in such a manner as to reduce rates of water
level decline prior to 2025. 5
Consider again the hypothetical aquifer system introduced in Figure
52. This will be the case only if development of the aquifer already meets the goals of property
right protection and public interest management. Where overdevelopment (with respect to these
goals) exists, the approved transfer might entail a lessening of the pumping drawdown and/or static
water level decline.
53. See Schaab, supra note 2, for a general review of existing law on impairment and replacement.
In particular, note the description of the New Mexico "plan of replacement" statute (N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 72-12A (Repl. Pamp. 1985)). See also Comment, New Mexico's Mine DeWateringAct: The
Search for Rehoboth, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653 (1980).
54. This proposal does not presume the administrative agency would decide upon the terms of
the agreement (so long as the solution is within the criteria). But see Schaab, supra note 2, at 4243, for a description of the New Mexico State Engineer's discretion in reviewing plans of replacement.
55. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, MANAGEMENT PLAN: FIRST MANAGEMENT PERIOD
(1980-1990), Tucson Active Management Area (1984).
56. ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN, §§45-401 through 45-637 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
57. The Groundwater Code sets a goal of safe-yield for the Phoenix, Tucson, and Prescott AMAs,
to be achieved by 2025.
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*cumulative drawdowns in parentheses

FIGURE 4
Contours of a Nonpumping Water Level Declines (in feet) from Original Pumping
Rates (after one season)
3. This aquifer system now has three right holders pumping two cubic
feet per second (cfs) at A, 2 cfs at B, and 2 cfs at C, as shown in Figure
4. The nonpumping water level declines after pumping for one season
are over six feet per year at each well site and cumulative interference
at each site is from six to seven feet during the pumping season (see
Figure 4). A prospective right holder wants to purchase a right at B.
However, first he must satisfy the groundwater management agency that
the transfer will meet the hydrologic response criteria. For the purpose
of this example, the criteria are five feet per season for cumulative interference and three feet per year nonpumping water level decline.
Using these criteria and a model of the aquifer, the agency determines
that the transfer, as proposed, must be denied because it perpetuates the
six feet per year nonpumping water level decline and the six to seven
feet per season cumulative interference. According to our model of the
basin, for the prospective pumper to obtain a right for 2 cfs at B, he
would have to buy A's right and at least one-half of C's right. Having
"retired" those two rights (or portions of rights), the two hydrologic
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FIGURE 5
Contours of Nonpumping Water Level Declines (in feet) from "Transfer" Pumping
Rates (after one season)
response criteria would be met (see Figure 5). Whether this type of
transaction (the purchase of three rights to use one) is "appropriate" or
"fair" is an intriguing question-one I will not presume to answer here.
To summarize, a groundwater right can be defined by identifying the
rate of diversion or quantity of withdrawal over a pumping season, and
the consumptive use portion of that diversion. The consumptive use may
be transferred to a new location as long as the two hydrologic response
criteria are satisfied in that location. In other words, the cumulative
interference limit of the existing right holders in the new area and the
allowable rate of nonpumping water level decline must be maintained by
the transfer.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The major difference between the proposed definition of property rights
in groundwater and the existing definitions found in the literature 8 is that
58. These "definitions" are found in the statute, case law, and administration reviews of Schaab,
supra note 2; Grant, supra notes 2 and 36; and Emel, supra note 31.
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impairment of third-parties (both existing right holders and the public in
its interest in resource availability over the long-term) is formally defined.
Major distinctions between formal rules limiting hydrologic response and
the standard of reasonable water levels or the well spacing criterion relate
to predictability and equity of protection. Established limits on third-party

aspects are, by definition, knowable in advance. Established limits generate predictable consequences. The standard of reasonableness in deter-

mining pumping lift or nonpumping water level adequacy requires the
discretionary interpretation of the administrator (or judge) which may
change from case to case. Although precedent may provide some continuity to these interpretations, evolution of the public interest in a new
direction, political pressure brought to bear on the offices of the administrator, or changes in personnel are but a few of the many factors that
contribute to relatively less predictability. 9

The proposed limits on hydrologic response treat right holders equitably
in terms of hydrology (in that site-specific aquifer characteristics and
pumping patterns are taken into consideration), and equally in terms of
economic access. Domestic users (in the absence of any other stipulations)
are given the same protection as irrigators or industrial users; all right
holders receive the same water level decline rate and cumulative interference protection. Knowing these limits in advance, a right holder who

is financially unable to pump after investing in pumping facilities has no
one to blame but himself.'
59. Value judgement is not absent from the formal rule mode of administration. Development of
a rule requires a weighing of values, a determining of purpose. Once these judgments are made,
however, the task of the administrator is fact finding. The questions which remain are answerable
through technical expertise. "Will the proposed withdrawal cause pumping lifts to increase more
than 10 feet in 5 years or will it not?"
In contrast with initial formative judgment required by rules, standard application leaves the
administrator with decisions of both fact and value in every case. Hydrologic analysis must be done
to protect the impacts of a proposed withdrawal- then someone-the judge, the hydrologist, the
engineer or the planner-must decide whether the impacts are acceptable or undesirable.
60. It is interesting to note that the most dramatic cases of overdevelopment have occurred in
states using the discretionary "reasonable" impairment approach. Idaho and Oregon required reduction or discontinuance of pumping in order to satisfy statutory mandates for management of
groundwater as a renewable resource. In Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 375, 513 P.2d 627
(1973), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a district court's decision ordering 15 out of 19 pumpers
to discontinue pumping so as not to exceed an estimate of average anticipated natural recharge.
(Water levels were drawing down at the rate of 20 feet per year.) The Oregon Water Resources
Department has "cut back" pumping in at least 3 of the critical groundwater areas. In the Butter
Creek Critical Area, irrigators of some 5 to 6,000 acres were ordered to cease pumping (telephone
interview with B. Bartholomew, Chief of Groundwater, Water Resources Department, Oregon State
Engineer's Office (Jan. 1981)). As expected, water levels in these areas have stabilized or recovered
since the orders were given declaring them critical areas. (See Oregon Water Resources Department,
Report for the Period 1977 to 1978 (1978). The renewable resource objective has been achieved,
but at considerable cost to individuals.
Overdevelopment of such proportion is absent where agencies have employed formal rules for
static water level decline. Even the most lenient allowable rate of decline does not exceed 30 feet
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On the other hand, one can argue that the reasonable pumping lift
concept and the well spacing criterion have merits that would be denied
were the proposed right definition to be adopted in their places. The well
spacing criterion is easy to administer and produces a measure of control
over cumulative drawdown (and possibly even static water level decline).
The reasonable pumping lift concept offers flexibility. Flexibility in property right definition affords administrators and right holders the opportunity to react to changing circumstances, competing social and economic
goals, and an unpredictable future. 6 Another argument for the use of the
reasonableness standard as opposed to formally established limits supports
the greater capacity of the former for precisely promoting the objectives
of the law. Rules are an inexact means to an end; standards are able to
achieve specific substantive outcomes because they allow consideration
of the situational ethics of each case. 62
Considered within the context of a market allocation of groundwater
rights where the commodity right needs identification to increase market
proficiency, flexibility and situational ethics seem obstructive and arbitrary, particularly where there are numerous right holders and applications
for transfer. For discretionary determinations of reasonable pumping lifts
involving knowledge of economic and other social conditions, information requirements would be tremendous in a rapidly developing aquifer
of great extent. Leaving the vigilance up to the individual right holders
is an alternative, but one that cannot ensure protection of the water supply
itself. Furthermore, many right holders, few of whom are trained in
hydrology, may not suspect their access to water is threatened. It may
be that rights will be protected in some cases only after investments are
lost and court costs surrendered.
Rules or guidelines establishing rates of water level decline arrest the
insecurity and unpredictability that accompany totally discretionary decisionmaking. Investments in land and water development are generally
sizeable financial undertakings (one irrigation well can cost as much as
$140,000 in the Avra Valley near Tucson) 63 and should not be forfeited
because of an ineffective permit and transfer process. Criteria and methods
of analysis for permit and transfer review should be well defined. The
in 3 years (WAsH. ADMIN. CODE R. 173-130, 1976). The criterion in the Mimbres Basin of New
Mexico is much stricter at 2.5 feet per year. That the right holders in these areas of formal rule or
guideline have not been forced to discontinue pumping suggests that the use of such rules may serve
to keep investment losses at a minimum.
61. LAW, MORALITY, AND SocIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART (Hacker & Raz eds.
1977).
62. Kennedy, supra note 39, at 1689, states that "the choice of rules as the mode of (legal)
intervention involves the sacrifice of precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind the
rules."
63. S. HATHORN, JR., 1982 ARIZONA PUMP WATER BUDGETs (Pima County, Agricultural Extension
Service, Tucson, 1982).
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administrator, however, should have latitude to make appropriate adjustments where unwavering application (of the criteria and methods of
analysis) would result in clearly insupportable effects.
The upshot of this discussion is that we can define a property right in
groundwater that is enforceable, meets aquifer development requirements,
and is transferable. This water right is: 1) the amount of water historically
pumped (if return flow is insignificant) or consumptively diverted, that
2) in transfer (to a new owner or location), is limited by the allowable
cumulative well interference (the additional pumping lift caused by the
pumping of neighboring wells) and the allowable rate of nonpumping
water level decline. This means that discretionary decisionmaking and
situational "reasonableness" must be abandoned for formally established
limits on the hydrologic responses from pumping. And while the consumptive use rate is the general measure of the right, it will only be
transferable if the proposed pumping rate satisfies the cumulative well
interference and nonpumping water level decline rate at the new location.
Whether or not the benefits of greater predictability, commodity identification, and controlled aquifer development are warranted by the transaction costs and loss of flexibility in decisionmaking is a serious issue.
The complications in transferring groundwater rights from one location
to another stem from complex physical and economic conditions that will
not go away just because we want the market to clear more quickly.
There may be a better way to define groundwater rights; there is no easy
way.

